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Abstract - The paper shows that in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Knightian uncertainty, formalised by 
multiple priors, may entail cooperation at a generalised Nash Equilibrium. The main idea is that 
players may have an attitude towards uncertainty that depends upon their available strategies. In 
particular, if players anticipate to be sufficiently more optimistic when choosing to cooperate, than 
when defecting, then they may indeed cooperate. Though uncommon in economic modelling, 
choice-dependent uncertainty attitude formalises a behaviour which is well understood and widely 
accepted by cognitive psychologists, within the theory of Cognitive Dissonance.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Since Ellesberg (1996) the presence of Knightian uncertainty, concerning a decision 
maker’s (DM) information on the probabilities governing the relevant random experiment, has 
been accepted as a possible explanation for empirical evidence inconsistent with the 
prescriptions of Expected Utility (EU).  To formalise behavioural departures from EU based on 
Knightian uncertainty, two approaches have been well received by the economic literature. The 
first is founded on a unique non-additive probability distribution Schmeidler (1989) while the 
other on a multiplicity of additive probability distributions Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989).  Both 
these approaches have subsequently been applied also to games in normal form Dow-Werlang 
(1994), Eichberger-Kelsey (1999), Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996), Marinacci (2000) and in extensive 
form Lo (1999). In these contributions individuals are assumed to be uncertainty averse, fully 
pessimistic. This is certainly consistent with Ellesberg’s empirical evidence although, in 
principle, full pessimism may not necessarily be considered as a compelling assumption. Based 
on this consideration in the paper we shall argue that, in a static Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, 
the so called cooperative outcome could obtain as a generalised (to multiple priors) Nash 
Equilibrium. In particular, the main result establishes that when players have an appropriate type 
of uncertainty on the opponent’s actions, cooperation may emerge as long as individuals’ 
uncertainty attitude is strategy-dependent. More specifically, the fundamental point behind the 
result is the consideration that players could be ex-ante (before making a choice) aware that   2
different actions may entail ex-post (after the choice is made) different personal attitudes 
towards uncertainty.  
While uncommon in economic theorising, choice-dependent attitudes are well 
understood within Cognitive Psychology as an individual’s adaptation to situations of cognitive 
dissonance (CD) (Festinger, 1957) among personal cognitions. In short, the general idea behind 
CD is that such inconsistency (dissonance) entails an unpleasant state of internal tension on the 
part of the individual experiencing so, who then seeks to recover consistency. When there is a 
discrepancy between them, attitude is more likely to adapt to accommodate behaviour. In a 
static PD, choice of the cooperative strategy would clearly be dissonant with its being strictly 
dominated; ex-post (after the cooperative strategy is selected) such inconsistency could be 
eliminated if the player is sufficiently optimistic on the opponent choosing to cooperate. Finally, 
though within a different conceptual framework, it’s worth mentioning that the notion of 
ratifiability (Jeffrey, 1983) will also lead to similar conclusions.    
 
2.  The Model  
 





In it strategy D(efection) strictly dominates C(ooperation) for both the T(op) and the (R)ow 
player, so that the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the PD is the profile (D,D). The pair (C,C) is   3
often referred to as the cooperative profile since it generates a strictly Pareto superior outcome to 
(D,D).   
  Suppose now T and R to be genuinely (Knightian) uncertain about the opponent’s choice 
and that this uncertainty is formalised by a set of additive probability distributions (Gilboa-
Schmeidler, 1989). This is typically called the multiple priors approach. More formally let q and p, 
respectively, be the probability with which T and R choose C. Then assume that R thinks 
q∈MT⊆[0,1] and T believes p∈MR⊆[0,1] where, to simplify the exposition and without much loss 
of generality, MT  and MR are closed subsets of [0,1]. We now introduce and formalise the idea of 
strategy-dependent uncertainty attitude.  
 
Definition 1 (Strategy-Dependent Uncertainty Attitude)  A strategy dependent-uncertainty 
attitude for R is a pair{q(C)∈MT ,q(D)∈MT} and for T is a pair{p(C)∈MR, p(D)∈MR}.   
 
To save on notation {q(C)∈MT, q(D)∈MT} and {p(C)∈MR, p(D)∈MR} will, from now 
on, be {q(C),q(D)} and {p(C),p(D)}. Our interpretation of the above definition is that two pairs 
are the probability distributions that (respectively) R and T’s uncertainty attitude “select” upon 
having chosen strategies C and D. To exemplify suppose q(C)=max{q¦q∈MT}  and 
q(D)=min{q¦q∈MT}; then this would indicate R’s full “optimism” at C and full “pessimism” at 
D. Clearly, intermediate cases could also be conceived. An analogous reasoning would hold for 
T too. Finally, it is easy to see that standard game theoretic analysis assumes q(C)=q(D).  
  We are now ready to provide the definition of Generalised (to multiple priors) Nash 
Equilibrium (GNE) in the PD. In it Πk, with k∈{R,T}, will be player’s k expected payoff, and 
(p,q), with p∈MR⊆ [0,1] and q∈MT⊆ [0,1], a generic strategy profile.  
   4
Definition 2 (GNE) A strategy profile (p*,q*) is a GNE of the Prisoner’s Dilemma if  
a)  p* = argmaxp ΠR = p[aq(C)+c(1- q(C))] + (1-p)[bq(D)+d(1- q(D))]   
     q* = argmaxq ΠT = q[ap(C)+c(1- p(C))] + (1-q)[bp(D)+d(1- p(D))] 
b)  p*∈MR and q*∈MT.  
 
The first point of the above definition generalises the standard maximisation 
procedure to accommodate strategy-dependent uncertainty attitude while the second specifies 
consistency between chosen strategies and expectations on the opponent’s choice, in the form of 
a set of additive prior probabilities.  
We are now capable to state the main result of the paper, showing the possibility of 
cooperation, with probability one, as a GNE.  
 
Proposition 1The strategy profile (1,1) is a GNE of the Prisoner’s Dilemma if and only if  
i)  q(C)>q(D)(b-d)/(a-c)+(d-c)/(a-c) 
ii)  p(C)>p(D)(b-d)/(a-c)+(d-c)/(a-c) 
iii)      1∈MR, 1∈MT and MR, MT are not singletons. 
 
Proof Immediate. (Necessity) Suppose (1,1) is a GNE. Then, by consistency (point (b) of 
Definition 2), p=1∈MR and q=1∈MT; moreover, MR and MT are not singletons. Indeed suppose 
they were; then, for example, player’s R expected utilities, upon choosing C and D, become 
aq(C)+c(1-q(C))=a, bq(D)+d(1-q(D))=b so that p*=0. An analogous reasoning would clearly hold 
for player T. Finally, it is immediate to see that inequalities (i) and (ii) must hold for (1,1) to 
satisfy (a) in the definition of GNE. (Sufficiency) is evident and omitted. 
    5
  We see the following two as the main messages conveyed by Proposition 1. The first is that 
for pure cooperation to occur at a GNE there must be an appropriate kind of uncertainty. In 
particular, it is not enough for each player to conceive that the opponent could cooperate with 
probability one since this, alone, would induce defection as optimal reply. Moreover, before 
choosing their (mixed) strategies players must be aware that they would be sufficiently more 
optimistic upon having chosen C with respect to D. Finally the following corollary identifies 
conditions, on the set of multiple priors, allowing the strategy profile (1,1) to be an equilibrium 
of the GNE.   
    
Corollary 1 Let p = min{p ¦ p∈MR} and q= min{q ¦ q∈MT}; then if p,q<(a-d)/(b-d) there exist pairs 
{q(C),q(D)} and {p(C) ,p(D)} such that the strategy profile (1,1) is a GNE of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 
Proof Start with the condition on q (discussion on p will be analogous) and consider the 
inequality q(C)>q(D)(b-d)/(a-c)+(d-c)/(a-c). It is q(C)=1 at q(D)=(a-d)/(b-d); moreover, q(D)(b-d)/(a-
c)+(d-c)/(a-c)>q(D) so that if q<(a-d)/(b-d) the above inequality can be satisfied and the pair (1,1) 
could be a GNE of the Prisoner’s Dilemma when, for example, q(C)=1 and q(D)=(a-d)/(b-d) (and 
p(C)=1 and p(D)=(a-d)/(b-d)). 
 
Namely, for the possibility of cooperation with probability one to obtain at a GNE agents 
must conceive low enough probabilities concerning the choice of strategy C on the part of the 
opponent.   
  Cooperation could however obtain in more general (purely mixed strategy equilibrium) 
situations, namely even when the strategy profile p=1, q=1 may not belong to players’ set of 
prior probabilities. The following result, the easy proof of which is omitted, formalises so.    6
 
Proposition 2 The strategy profile (p*,q*), with 1>p*,q*>0 is a GNE of the Prisoner’s Dilemma if and 
only if 
i)  q(C)=q(D)(b-d)/(a-c)+(d-c)/(a-c) 
ii)  p(C)=p(D)(b-d)/(a-c)+(d-c)/(a-c) 
iii)  p*∈MR, q*∈MT and MR, MT are not singletons. 
 
Finally, from the above results it follows that 
 




In this paper we discussed how cooperation may emerge, as a Generalised Nash   
Equilibrium, in a static Prisoner’s Dilemma where players are appropriately uncertain about the 
opponent’s choice, uncertainty is formalised by a set of multiple additive priors and 
individuals’ uncertainty attitude is strategy-dependent. This last assumption could be 
introduced to formalise a player’s reasoning when facing a situation known in Cognitive 
Psychology as being of cognitive dissonance. In a static Prisoner’s Dilemma such dissonance 
could arise should a player choose the cooperative strategy. If, indeed, she were to select it she 
would face an (unpleasant personal tension due to) internal inconsistency between her initial 
view of the strategy (as being strictly dominated) and the fact that she has chosen it. After 
having made that choice, mitigation of such dissonance could come about through an optimistic 
(ex-post) view on the part of the player that the opponent will be more likely to choose to   7
cooperate rather than to defect. If an agent is ex-ante aware of her ex-post reactions to 
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